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Demonstrating the Requisite Level of Proof
for a Federal Trademark Dilution Claim:
Establishing Actual Dilution Following
Moseley v. Victoria's Secret
Michael J. Schwarz*
Introduction
In March of 2003, the Supreme Court decided Moseley v.
Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc.' In Moseley, the Court was
called upon to determine the level of proof required to establish
a prima facie case of trademark dilution under the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA).2 The Court held that the
FTDA unequivocally requires "objective proof of actual injury"
before the holder of a senior mark can fashion a successful fed-
eral claim of trademark dilution against a junior user.3 As
such, the Moseley decision overruled the "likelihood of dilution"
standard used in several federal courts to establish a claim of
dilution under the FTDA.4
Trademark dilution occurs where a third party uses a mark
that is either identical or substantially similar to the original
mark, thereby diminishing the distinctiveness of the original
mark.5 While Moseley established the test of dilution, the
Court's decision "has created uncertainty as to how much evi-
dence, [and] what type of evidence, [will] be enough [to prove
* B.A., Politics and Government from the University of Puget Sound. J.D.
Candidate, 2005, Pace University School of Law.
1. 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
2. Id. at 421-22 ("The question we granted certiorari to decide is whether ob-
jective proof of actual injury to the economic value of a famous mark (as opposed to
a presumption of harm arising from a subjective 'likelihood of dilution' standard) is
a requisite for relief under the FTDA.").
3. Id. at 422, 433.
4. See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 209 F.3d 562 (6th Cir. 2000),
remanded to 192 F. Supp. 2d. 790 (W.D. Tenn. 2001); Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands,
Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).
5. Amy E. Pulliam, Note, Raising the Bar Too High: Moseley v. V Secret Cata-
logue, Inc. and Relief Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 53 CATH. U. L.




actual dilution]."6 The purpose of this casenote is to examine
the history of federal trademark dilution law, to analyze the im-
pact of the Moseley decision on federal trademark dilution law,
and finally, to critically examine the methods of proof used in
post-Moseley courts to establish "actual dilution." In so doing,
this casenote attempts to provide a useful guide to practition-
ers, and their clients, who wish to present an adequate eviden-
tiary showing of "actual dilution" to establish a dilution claim
under the FTDA.
Part I of this article describes the purpose of a trademark
and briefly addresses the historical development of federal
trademark dilution law. Part II discusses the statutory author-
ity for federal trademark dilution law, the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act of 1995, and the requirements it places upon a
party pursuing a federal dilution claim, as well as the types of
dilution claims permitted under the Act. Part III reviews the
Supreme Court case, Moseley v. Victoria's Secret, and its impact
upon federal dilution law. Finally, Part IV examines several re-
cent federal cases that have interpreted the Moseley decision.
This section discusses the types of evidentiary showings that
have been used to establish a federal dilution claim,7 suggests
several types of proof that may be relevant to establishing "ac-
tual dilution" in a post-Moseley court, and ultimately concludes
that a wide variety of evidence should be used to establish "ac-
tual dilution."
Part I: The Function of a Trademark, and the History of
Trademark Dilution Law in the United States
A. The Functions of a Trademark
Trademarks are invaluable in modern society as companies
rely heavily upon them to promote their goods and services and
to develop brand loyalty.8 Furthermore, trademarks are a
means by which a senior mark holder can prevent other produc-
6. Edward Vassallo & Tila Duhaime, Supreme Court Tightens Trade Mark
Law, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (May 2003), available at http://www.fitz
patrickcella.comnimages/pub-attachment/attachment122.pdf at 3.
7. Conversely, this section notes several recent decisions where the courts
found that a party's evidentiary showing was insufficient and incapable of estab-
lishing a dilution claim under the FTDA.
8. See Pulliam, supra note 5, at 887.
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ers from tricking customers into purchasing a product under
the mistaken belief that it is endorsed by the trademark owner. 9
A trademark is defined as "any word, name, symbol, device, or
any combination thereof.., used by a person... to identify and
distinguish [their] goods... from those manufactured or sold by
others and to indicate the source of the goods . . ."1o As this
broad definition suggests, a trademark serves several pertinent
functions for its owner and for society in general.
Essentially, the purpose of a trademark is fourfold. First, a
trademark serves an advertising function for the mark holder,"
helping to promote and publicize goods and services offered by
the senior mark holder. Second, a trademark serves an identifi-
cation function 12 - "it is a device by which a consumer distin-
guishes among similar goods or services offered by more than
one manufacturer. " 13 Third, a trademark serves a guarantee
function because it assures purchasers of a certain degree of
uniformity and quality.14 Finally, it is through the identity and
quality functions that a trademark performs its ultimate func-
tion - "stimulat[ing] further purchases by the consuming pub-
lic."15 Due to the fact that trademarks serve so many valuable
purposes, it is not difficult to understand why one individual,
9. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
11. Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65
TRADEMARK REP. 265, 290 (1975). "A trademark... is a symbolic device that can be
used in advertising. More specifically, the package that bears the trademark be-
comes an advertising medium itself .... ." Id.
12. 74 AM. JuR. 2D Trademarks and Tradenames § 1 (2001) [hereinafter
Trademarks and Tradenames]; see also Caterpillar Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F.
Supp. 2d 913, 921 (C.D. Ill. 2003) ("[Trademarks serve as an identifier of the
source of the products, goods or services in question.").
13. Trademarks and Tradenames, supra note 12. "The consumer learns to rec-
ognize a particular trademark as a symbol of quality. It guarantees the public that
the goods purchased today will be the same as the goods bearing the same trade-
mark that were purchased yesterday." Diamond, supra note 11, at 289. While "a
trademark does not necessarily guarantee good quality ... it does guarantee con-
sistency." Id.
14. Trademarks and Tradenames, supra note 12.
15. Frank Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARv.
L. REV. 813, 818 (1927). See also Caterpillar Inc., 287 F. Supp. 2d at 921 ("A trade-
mark can lead consumers to expect a certain level of quality in the product to
which it is affixed, presumably increasing sales or awareness of the product. Con-
versely, when consumers purchase a subpar product bearing that trademark and




Frank Schechter, appealed to the federal government in hopes
of extending additional protections to these important marks. 16
B. The History of Trademark Law and the Development of
Trademark Dilution
Trademark dilution amounts to the reduction of a trade-
mark's value when it is used by another entity to identify goods
and services that are not traditionally associated with the se-
nior mark.17 The concept of dilution in the United States has
been credited to Frank Schechter's 1927 law review article, The
Rational Basis of Trademark Protection.'8 Schechter argued
that the "real injury" caused by the use of "similar marks on
non-competing goods" is "the gradual whittling away or disper-
sion of the identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark
or name by its use upon non-competing goods." 9 Since the
value of a trademark "lies in its selling power" and the selling
power of a trademark "depends . . . upon its own uniqueness
and singularity," Schechter concluded that "the preservation of
the uniqueness of a trademark should constitute the only ra-
tional basis for its protection."20 As such, Schechter "advocated
adopting law that would prevent 'dilution' of a trademark's uni-
queness and ... its selling power."21
Nearly 20 years after Schecter proposed his radical ideas
regarding trademark dilution, Congress passed the Lanham Act
of 1947.22 The Lanham Act was one of the first attempts by the
federal government to regulate the field of trademarks. 23 In
passing the Act, Congress intended to:
16. See generally Schechter, supra note 15.
17. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2002)
(Trademark dilution "refers to the 'whittling away of the value of a trademark'
when [it is] used to identify different products.").
18. See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 429; Kellogg Co. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 192 F.
Supp. 2d 790, 796 (W.D. Tenn. 2001).
19. Schechter, supra note 15, at 825.
20. Id. at 831.
21. Exxon Mobil Corp., 192 F. Supp. 2d. at 796.
22. Jennifer Hemerly, The "Secret" of Our Success: The Sixth Circuit Inter-
prets the Proof Requirement Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act in V Secret
Catalogue v. Moseley, 9 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 321, 327 (2002).
23. Trademark regulation has more historic roots than the Lanham Act. The
importance of trademarks can be traced back to the industrial revolution, where
producers fought vigorously to protect their marks. See Robert N. Klieger, Trade-
mark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protec-
160 [Vol. 25:157
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regulate commerce within the control of Congress by making ac-
tionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks in such com-
merce; to protect registered marks used in such commerce from
interference by state, or territorial legislation; to protect persons
engaged in such commerce from unfair competition; to prevent
fraud and deception in such commerce by use of reproductions,
copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations of registered marks;
and to provide rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and con-
ventions respecting trademarks, tradenames and unfair competi-
tion entered into between the United States and foreign nations.
24
The Lanham Act extended protection to a senior trademark if
the junior mark was "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mis-
take, or to deceive,"25 and the junior user could be held liable by
any party likely to be damaged by such an action. 26 Neverthe-
less, the Lanham Act, as originally drafted, could hardly be con-
sidered a bastion of federal trademark dilution law. To the
contrary, the Lanham Act disregarded the concept of dilution
proposed by Schechter, and instead employed a "consumer con-
fusion" test that could be used to prove a claim of trademark
infringement. 27
Despite the fact that federal law failed to provide a cause of
action for dilution, the theory of dilution began to find support
at the state level. 28 Massachusetts was the first state to provide
a cause of action for trademark dilution when it adopted its own
dilution statute in 1947.29 By late 1995, over half of the states
tion, 58 U. Prrr. L. REV. 789, 797 (1997). In essence, the forces of large scale
production "drove a wedge" between producers of goods and the ultimate users of
the products, and producers began to employ trademarks in order to differentiate
their products from other goods sold in the market. Id. at 797-98. Nevertheless,
Congress did not formally attempt to regulate trademarks until the 1870's when it
created the first federal trademark registration scheme which was ultimately held
unconstitutional. Id. at 798. Nearly a decade later, Congress adopted a second,
more limited, federal registration statute in 1881. Id. In 1905, Congress adopted
the Trademark Act of 1905 which was yet another federal registration scheme that
remained in effect until the passage of the Lanham Act in 1946. Id.
24. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127; Superformance Int'l, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co.,
332 F.3d 215, 222 (4th Cir. 2003).
25. Hemerly, supra note 22, at 327.
26. Susan Turcotte, Caught in a Corporate Panty Raid: Moseley v. V Secret
Catalogue, Inc., 40 Hous. L. REV. 867, 875-76 (2003).
27. Hemerly, supra note 22, at 327.
28. Id. at 327-28.
29. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co. v. Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc., 330 F.3d 1333, 1340
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (the statute "provid[ed] a cause of action for dilution 'notwith-
20041
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had adopted some kind of dilution statute;30 however, these
statutes vary widely on the standards required for establishing
dilution.31 A large proportion of these state anti-dilution stat-
utes required only a "likelihood of dilution" to establish a cause
of action for trademark dilution. 32
Since dilution statutes were being adopted at the state level
rather than the national level, a "patchwork system" of incon-
gruent anti-dilution statutes developed. 33 This system "made it
difficult for companies to implement national brand manage-
ment strategies and encouraged forum shopping for those state
courts which offered the broadest protection" to trademark own-
standing the absence of competition between the parties or the absence of confu-
sion as to the source of goods or services.'").
30. Turcotte, supra note 26, at 876.
To date, approximately thirty-seven states have adopted anti-dilution laws.
See ALA. CODE § 8-12-17 (2004); ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.180 (Michie 2003); ARIz.
Rev. STAT. § 44-1448.01 (2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-71-213 (Michie 2003); CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14330(a) (West 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-11i(c) (2003);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 3313 (2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 495.151 (West 2003); GA.
CODE ANN. § 10-1-451(b) (2003); HAw. REV. STAT § 482-32 (2003); IDAHO CODE
§ 48-513 (Michie 2004); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1036/65 (2004); IOWA CODE § 548.113
(2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 81-214 (2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:223.1 (West
2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1530 (West 2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
ll0B, § 12 (West 2004); MINN. STAT. § 333.285 (2003); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-25-25
(2004); Mo. REV. STAT. § 417.061 (2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-13-334 (2003);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-140 (2003); NEV. REV. STAT. 600.435 (2004); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 350-A:12 (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:3-13.20 (West 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 57-3B-15 (Michie 2004); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 360-1 (McKinney 2004); OR. REV.
STAT. § 647.107 (2003); 54 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1124 (2004); R.I. GEN. LAws § 6-2-12
(2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-15-1165 (Law. Co-op. 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-
513 (2004); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 16.29 (Vernon 2004); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 70-3a-403 (2004); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.77.160 (2004); W. VA. CODE § 47-2-13
(2003); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-115 (Michie 2003).
31. Turcotte, supra note 26, at 876.
The states which currently require only a likelihood of dilution include: Ala-
bama, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Texas.
SIEGRUN D. KANE, TRADEMARK LAw: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE § 9:2.1, at app. 20
(4th ed. 2003). The states which now follow the federal statute, and which require
a showing of actual dilution, include: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Ha-
waii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey,
New Mexico, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Wash-
ington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See id.
32. Turcotte, supra note 26, at 876. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. l10B,
§ 12; N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 360-1; OR. REV. STAT. § 647.107; R.I. GEN. LAws § 6-2-
12.
33. Turcotte, supra note 26, at 878.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol25/iss1/6
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ers.34 Congress sought to alleviate these problems by adopting
a new law that could bring uniformity and consistency to the
protection of trademarks. 35 As was stated in the House of Rep-
resentative's Report Number 104-374:
Presently, the nature and extent of the remedies against trade-
mark dilution varies from state to state and, therefore, can pro-
vide unpredictable and inadequate results for the trademark
owner. The federal remedy provided in [the FTDA] against trade-
mark dilution will bring uniformity and consistency to the protec-
tion of famous marks. 36
Thus, a national standard was born when Congress drafted the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (FTDA) to amend the
Lanham Act.3 7 Nearly 50 years after Schecter's initial proposal
for establishing a national trademark dilution law, President
Clinton signed the FTDA into effect on January 16, 1996.38
Part II: The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995
A. Highlighting the Operative Provisions of the FTDA
The FTDA defines "dilution" as "the lessening of the capac-
ity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or ser-
vices, regardless of the presence or absence of - (1) competition
between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2)
likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception."39 In determining
whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may consider
several factors, including the degree of inherent or acquired dis-
tinctiveness of the mark;40 the duration and extent of use of the
mark in connection with the goods or services with which the
mark is used;41 the duration and extent of advertising and pub-
licity of the mark;42 the geographical extent of the trading area
34. Id.
35. Id. It should be noted that Congress attempted to amend the Lanham Act
in 1988 to include a dilution provision, a provision known as the Trademark Law
Revision Act of 1988; however, the amendment proved unsuccessful. See KANE,
supra note 31, at § 9:2.1.
36. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995).
37. Turcotte, supra note 26, at 876; see also KANE, supra note 31, at § 9:3.2.
38. Turcotte, supra note 26, at 876.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(A) (2000).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(B).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(C).
1632004]
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in which the mark is used;43 the channels of trade for the goods
or services with which the mark is used;44 the degree of recogni-
tion of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade used
by the mark's owner and the person against whom the injunc-
tion is sought;45 the nature and extent of the use of the same or
similar marks by third parties;46 and finally, whether the mark
has been registered.4 7
While it is integral for a senior mark holder to establish
that its mark is famous in order to obtain relief under the
FTDA, this is only one element of a federal trademark dilution
claim.48 To establish a prima facie case of trademark dilution
under the FTDA, a plaintiff must also show that (1) their fa-
mous mark is inherently distinctive;49 (2) the defendant has
made commercial use of the senior mark in commerce; 50 (3) the
defendant began using the junior mark after the senior mark
became famous; 51 and (4) the defendant's use of the junior mark
43. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(D).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(E).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(F).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(G).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(H).
48. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998);
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) ("The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled ... to an
injunction against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or
trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilu-
tion of the distinctive quality of the mark .... .") (emphasis added). To determine
whether a mark is famous, see supra notes 40 to 47.
49. AutoZone, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 373 F.3d 786, 802 (6th Cir. 2004); Nabisco,
Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 1999); Panavision Int'l, L.P., 141
F.3d at 1324; Playtex Prods. v. Georgia-Pacific Inc., No. 02 Civ. 7848, 2003 WL
21939706 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2003). Notwithstanding, not all federal courts
require a plaintiff to prove that their mark is inherently distinctive. See, e.g.,
Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 670 (5th Cir. 2000);
Pinehurst, Inc. v. Wick, 256 F. Supp. 2d 424, 431 (M.D.N.C. 2003).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1); AutoZone, Inc., 373 F.3d at 802; Panavision Int'l,
L.P., 141 F.3d at 1324; Playtex Prods., 2003 WL 21939706 at *8.
Use in commerce is defined under 15 U.S.C. § 1127. The term "use in com-
merce" means the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not
made merely to reserve a right in a mark. Id. A mark pertaining to goods is
deemed to be used in commerce when: "(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods
or their containers or the displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels
affixed thereto, or if the nature of the goods makes such placement impracticable,
then on documents associated with the goods or their sale, and (B) the goods are
sold or transported in commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
51. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1); AutoZone, Inc., 373 F.3d 786; Panavision Int'l,
L.P., 141 F.3d at 1324; Playtex Prods., 2003 WL 21939706 at *8.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol25/iss1/6
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actually dilutes the distinctive quality of the senior mark by "di-
minishing the mark's capacity to identify and distinguish goods
and services."52
Once a party establishes its prima facie case, the FTDA
provides mechanisms for enforcing federal dilution claims
against violators. As a general matter, the owner of a famous
mark may bring a civil cause of action against an individual or a
corporation whose use of a junior mark dilutes the distinctive
quality of the senior mark.53 The remedies provided for dilution
include nationwide injunctive relief where a junior mark holder
engages in commercial use of the senior mark in violation of the
FTDA.54 Where a party willfully dilutes a senior mark in viola-
tion of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1), the holder of the famous mark is
not limited to injunctive relief; they may recover the profits ac-
quired by the improper use of the senior mark, any damages
sustained by the senior mark holder as a result of dilution, and
the costs of the legal action against the junior mark holder. 55
Furthermore, treble damages and prejudgment interest may be
awarded in limited instances.5 6 Finally, the senior mark holder
may demand the delivery and destruction of all materials used
by the junior mark holder to dilute the distinctive quality of the
famous mark.57
Even though the FTDA prohibits the commercial use of a
senior mark by a junior mark holder, and provides remedies
once improper usage of a famous mark has been demonstrated,
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1); AutoZone, Inc., 373 F.3d at 802; Panavision Int'l,
L.P., 141 F.3d at 1324; Playtex Prods., 2003 WL 21939706 at *8.
A mark pertains to services "when it is used or displayed in the sale or adver-
tising of services and the services are rendered in commerce, or the services are
rendered in more than one State or in the United States and a foreign country and
the person rendering the services is engaged in commerce in connection with the
services." 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
53. See Enter. Rent-A-Car Co. v. Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc., 330 F.3d 1333,
1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Section 1125(c)(1) provides that: "[tihe owner of a famous
mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of equity and upon such terms as
the court deems reasonable, to an injunction against another person's commercial
use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has
become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark, and to
obtain such other relief as is provided in this subsection." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2); 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2000 & Supp. 2002).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2); 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b) (2000 & Supp. 2002).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2); 15 U.S.C. § 1118 (2000).
1652004]
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the Act, in limited circumstances, permits a would-be violator to
use a senior mark without violating the Act.58 First, the FTDA
permits the "fair use of a famous mark by another person in
comparative commercial advertising or promotion to identify
the competing goods or services of the owner of the famous
mark."59 Second, the Act permits the noncommercial use of a
mark,60 such as use that is political in nature.61 Finally, usage
of a famous mark in all forms of news reporting and news com-
mentary is not actionable under the FTDA.62 The next logical
step in this analysis is to examine the types of dilution claims
that can be brought pursuant to the FTDA.
B. Types of Dilution Claims Permitted Under the FTDA
As a practical matter, two forms of dilution are actionable
under the FTDA, dilution by blurring or by tarnishment.6 3 As
58. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 904 (9th Cir. 2002).
("There are uses that, though potentially dilutive, are nevertheless permitted" by
the FTDA.); see generally J. THOMAS McCARTHY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:97 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing the FTDA's statutory
defenses).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(A); Mattel, Inc., 296 F.3d at 904.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B); see Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d
868, 880 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Commercial use under the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act requires the defendant to be using the trademark as a trademark, capitalizing
on its trademark status.").
61. See, e.g., MasterCard Int'l Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., No. 00
Civ. 6068, 2004 WL 434404 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 8, 2004). In this case, MasterCard
brought a federal trademark dilution claim against Ralph Nader and his political
committee. Id. at *1. Since the Fall of 1997, MasterCard had commissioned a se-
ries of advertisements known as the "Priceless Advertisements." Id. In this series,
a voice would identify a series of goods and services and the approximate value of
those goods and services. Id. At the end of a given advertisement, the commercial
would identify some intangible thing that could not be purchased, and a voiceover
or word would state: "Priceless. There are some things money can't buy, for every-
thing else there's MasterCard." Id. During Nader's 2000 political campaign, Na-
der and his presidential committee used an advertisement which imitated the
"Priceless Advertisements." Id. MasterCard claimed that Nader's use of the com-
pany's series of "Priceless Advertisements" diluted the senior mark and violated
the FTDA. Id. In dismissing Mastercard's federal dilution claim, the court held
that the use of a trademark, which was political in nature, was exempted from
coverage by the FTDA. See id. at *16.
62. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(C); Mattel, Inc., 296 F.3d at 904.
63. See AutoZone, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 373 F.3d 786, 801 (6th Cir. 2004); Mc-
CARTHY, supra note 58, at § 24:67.
Historically, the courts also recognized a third form of dilution known as
"cybersquatting." McCARTHY, supra note 58, at § 24:67. As the popularity of the
166
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the House Judiciary Committee stated, "the purpose of [the
FTDA] is to protect famous trademarks from subsequent uses
that blur the distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or disparage
it." 64 The FTDA seeks to prevent dilution through tarnishment
and blurring by "protecting the trademark owner from the ero-
sion of the distinctiveness and prestige of a trademark caused
by... a proliferation of borrowings, that... are so numerous as
to deprive the mark of its distinctiveness and hence its im-
pact."6 5 The aim of this section is to highlight the differences
between claims based upon a theory of tarnishment, and claims
based upon a theory of blurring.
Dilution by blurring is considered the classic form of dilu-
tion envisioned by the original proponents of dilution law.66
Internet increased, individuals began to reserve domain names consisting of the
names or trademarks of certain well-known companies. Id. at § 24:69.1. Such in-
dividuals, known as cybersquatters, would then sell back the domain names to the
corporations for a substantial price. Id. As this activity became more popular, the
courts were called upon to expand the principles of dilution law to protect senior
mark holders from "cybersquatting." Id. However, in 1999 Congress passed the
Anti-Cybersquatting Act (ACPA) which made "cybersquatting" actionable under
federal law. Id. In essence, the ACPA rendered dilution by "cybersquatting" obso-
lete. Id.
In Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 512 (7th Cir. 2002), Judge Posner hy-
pothesized that dilution may take another form that is distinct from tarnishment
or blurring. As Judge Posner stated, "there is a possible concern with situations in
which, though there is neither blurring nor tarnishment, someone is still taking a
free ride on the investment of the trademark owner in the trademark." Id. Posner
suggested the following hypothetical to describe dilution based upon a "free ride"
theory:
Suppose [there is an upscale restaurant named] "Tiffany". . . [which] is lo-
cated in Kuala Lumpur and though the people who patronize it . . .have
heard of [another store, the] Tiffany jewelry store, none of them is ever going
to buy anything there, so that the efficacy of the trademark as an identifier
will not be impaired. If appropriation of Tiffany's aura is nevertheless for-
bidden by an expansive concept of dilution, the benefits of the jewelry store's
investment in creating a famous name will be, as economists say, "internal-
ized" - that is, Tiffany will realize the full benefits of the investment rather
than sharing those benefits with others - and as a result the amount of in-
vesting in creating a prestigious name will rise.
Id. Nevertheless, Posner held that "this rationale for antidilution law has not yet
been articulated in or even implied by the case law, although a few cases suggest
that the concept of dilution is not exhausted by blurring and tarnishment." Id.
64. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 2 (1995).
65. AutoZone, Inc., 373 F.3d at 786; Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc.,
233 F.3d 456, 466 (7th Cir. 2000).
66. MCCARTHY, supra note 58, at § 24:68.
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Blurring occurs where "customers or prospective customers...
see the plaintiffs mark used on a plethora of different goods and
services."67 Essentially, "[a] defendant uses or modifies the
plaintiffs trademark to identify the defendant's goods and ser-
vices, raising the possibility that the mark will lose its ability to
serve as a unique identifier of the plaintiffs product."68 Com-
mon examples given to describe dilution through blurring are:
Buick aspirin, Schlitz varnish, Kodak pianos, and DuPont
shoes. 69
"Blurring occurs primarily to marks that, through their
high degree of distinctiveness or through their owner's exten-
sive advertising, create a 'positive response that is associated
exclusively with the goods or services of the trademark
owner."' 70 When a junior mark holder uses an identical or sub-
stantially similar mark on a different product, it causes con-
sumers to create a new association with the original mark
thereby harming the original mark holder. 71 "The original
mark is blurred to the extent that this new association de-
creases the [original] mark's 'selling power."' 72
Similarly, the FTDA has been found to support a cause of
action for tarnishment. 73 A trademark may be tarnished when
67. Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., 73 F.3d 497, 506 (2d Cir. 1996)
(discussing blurring under New York law); McCARTHY, supra note 58, at § 24:68
(As a result of blurring, "[clustomers or prospective customers will see the plain-
tiffs mark used by other persons to identify other sources on a plethora of different
goods and services.").
68. Hormel Foods Corp., 73 F.3d at 506.
69. Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1031 (2d
Cir. 1989) (discussing dilution through blurring pursuant to New York law); Mc-
CARHY, supra note 58, at § 24:68.
70. Patrick M. Bible, Defining and Quantifying Dilution Under the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Using Survey Evidence to Show Actual Dilution,
70 U. COLO. L. REV. 295, 305 (1998).
71. See id. at 305.
72. Id.
73. The problem with dilution by tarnishment is that there is some doubt,
following the Court's decision in Moseley, that this kind of claim is supported by
federal law. See Vassallo & Duhaime, supra note 6, at 4; see also 2 JEROME GILSON
ET AL., TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 5A.01 (2004) (The decision in
Moseley "cast[s] serious doubt on the viability of tarnishment claims under the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act.").
Notwithstanding, several recent decisions indicate that a claim of tarnishment
is still viable under the FTDA, despite the holding in Moseley. See, e.g., Playboy
Enters. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1033 (9th Cir. 2004)
(reversing a grant of summary judgment where plaintiffs introduced evidence
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it is "linked to products of shoddy quality, or is portrayed in an
unwholesome or unsavory context."74 As a result of tarnish-
ment, "the public will associate the lack of quality or lack of
prestige in the defendant's goods with the plaintiffs unrelated
goods." 75 Essentially, a product is tarnished where "it loses its
ability to serve as a 'wholesome identifier' of the plaintiffs
product." 76
"A junior user tarnishes an original mark when it degrades
the positive association of the senior user's mark, typically by
marketing products that create negative impressions of the
mark in the minds of consumers." 77 For example, the "ADULTS
R US" domain name for an Internet site which sold adult sexual
products was held to tarnish the "TOYS 'R' US" mark.78 Simi-
larly, "Garbage Pail Kids" cards tarnished the "Cabbage Patch
Kids" mark by depicting dolls in rude, violent, and noxious set-
tings.7 9 Thus, "[dlilution by 'tarnishing' occurs when a junior
mark's similarity to a famous mark causes consumers mistak-
tending to show the existence of dilution by tarnishment and by blurring); Wham-
0, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1260-62 (N.D. Cal.
2003) (recognizing two types of trademark dilution, dilution by blurring and by
tarnishment, but denying the plaintiffs motion for a temporary restraining order
due to lack of evidence); Caterpillar Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913,
922 (C.D. Ill. 2003) (recognizing that a claim for tarnishment exists under the Lan-
ham Act as amended by the FTDA, but the plaintiff failed to present evidence to
support its motion for a temporary restraining order); Perkins Sch. for the Blind v.
Maxi-Aids, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d 319, 326 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that even
though the plaintiff did not properly allege dilution by blurring, the plaintiff had
sufficiently alleged an action for tarnishment); MasterCard Int'l Inc. v. Nader 2000
Primary Comm., Inc., No. 00 Civ. 6068, 2004 WL 434404 at *6 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 8,
2004). (holding that under both federal and New York law, dilution can involve
either blurring or tarnishment). Similarly, at least one recent commentary has
advocated the position that the FTDA encompasses a cause of action for tarnish-
ment. See generally Layne T. Smith, Tarnishment and the FTDA: Lessening the
Capacity to Identify and Distinguish, 2004 BYU L. REV. 825 (2004).
74. Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir. 1996)
(citing Deere Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994)).
75. Id. at 507.
76. Id.
77. Bible, supra note 70, at 305.
78. Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Akkaoui, No. C 96-3381, 1996 WL 772709 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 29, 1996).
79. Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 642 F. Supp.
1032 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
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enly to associate the famous mark with the second user's infer-
ior or offensive product."80
Part III: Examining the Case of Moseley v. Victoria's Secret
A. Moseley v. Victoria's Secret: The Factual Background
In Moseley v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc., the Supreme
Court was called upon to decide the level of proof required to
establish a dilution claim under the FTDA.8' Prior to the
Court's ruling several circuits were split on the issue. Some
held that the FTDA required proof of "actual dilution,"82 while
others held that the lower standard of "likelihood of dilution"
satisfied the statute.8 3
The Defendants in the case, Victor and Cathy Moseley,
owned and operated a store named "Victor's Little Secret" in a
small strip mall in Elizabethtown, Kentucky.8 4 The store sold a
wide variety of items including: romantic lighting, adult videos,
adult novelties, and lingerie.8 5 The Plaintiff, holder of the "Vic-
toria's Secret" mark, owned and operated a national chain of
approximately 750 stores which sold "moderately priced, high
quality, [and] attractively designed lingerie."8 6 This included
multiple stores within a short driving distance of Elizabeth-
town, Kentucky. 7 In 1998, the Plaintiffs advertising expendi-
tures were $55 million, and its yearly sales were in excess of
$1.5 billion. 8 Further, the Plaintiff distributed 400 million cop-
ies of its catalog per year, including 39,000 in Elizabethtown.8 9
In February of 1998, an Army colonel received an advertise-
ment which noted the grand opening of the Defendants' store
(then named "Victor's Secret").90 The colonel sent a copy of the
80. Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1326 n.7 (9th Cir. 1998).
81. 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
82. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of
Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 464 (4th Cir. 1999).
83. See Kellogg Co. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 209 F.3d 562 (6th Cir. 2000);
Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).
84. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 422.
85. Id. at 423.
86. Id. at 422.
87. Id. at 422-23.
88. Id. at 423.
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advertisement to the Plaintiff claiming that he "was offended by
what he perceived to be an attempt to use a reputable com-
pany's trademark to promote the sale of'unwholesome, tawdry
merchandise."'91 After receiving the copy of the Defendants' ad-
vertisement, the Plaintiffs counsel sent a letter to the Defend-
ants requesting that they change the name of their store.92 The
Plaintiffs counsel contended that the Defendants' use of the
name "Victor's Secret" for a store selling lingerie was likely to
cause confusion with the Victoria's Secret mark, and was likely
to dilute the distinctiveness of the mark.
93
In response to the request, the Defendants changed the
name of their store to "Victor's Little Secret" which did not sat-
isfy the Plaintiff.94 Subsequently, the Plaintiff filed suit in fed-
eral court alleging, inter alia, trademark dilution under the
FTDA based upon the theories of tarnishment and blurring.
95
Specifically, the complaint alleged that the Defendant's conduct
was "likely to blur and erode the distinctiveness' and 'tarnish
the reputation' of the Victoria's Secret" mark.
96
Following discovery, both parties moved for summary judg-
ment.97 The parties submitted affidavits and deposition testi-
mony describing the size of the Plaintiffs business, the value of
the Victoria's Secret name, and the products sold at the respec-
tive stores. 98 Additionally, one of the Defendants stated in an
affidavit that lingerie sales accounted for only five percent of
the Defendant Company's sales.99 Nevertheless, no experts ex-
pressed an opinion on the impact of the Defendants' use of the
name "Victor's Little Secret" on the value of the "Victoria's Se-
cret" mark.100
The district court granted summary judgment to the Plain-
tiff, finding that the Defendants' mark had a tarnishing effect




94. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 423.
95. Id. at 423-24.
96. Id. at 424.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 424.




occurred. 101 Accordingly, the district court enjoined the Defend-
ants from using the "Victor's Little Secret" mark under a theory
of tarnishment.102 The case was appealed to the Sixth Circuit
which affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment.103
In so doing, the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed its recent determina-
tion that the "likelihood of dilution" standard was the proper
test for establishing a trademark dilution claim under the
FTDA. 0 4 The court held that "consumers who hear the name
'Victor's Little Secret' are likely automatically to think of the
more famous store and link it to the Moseley's adult-toy, gag
gift, and lingerie shop .. . [which] is a classic instance of dilu-
tion by tarnishing and.., by blurring."'0 5 The Defendants ap-
pealed the case to the Supreme Court which had the ultimate
power to resolve the circuit split, and to determine "whether ob-
jective proof of actual injury to the economic value of a famous
mark ... is a requisite for relief under the FTDA."06
B. The Holding, Rationale, and Reasoning of the Court
Ultimately, the Court held that contrary to the Sixth Cir-
cuit's decision, the text of the FTDA "unambiguously requires a
showing of actual dilution, rather than a likelihood of dilu-
tion."'0 7 The Court's holding was based upon a strict textual
analysis of the FTDA. Section 1125(c)(1) of the FTDA states
that the holder of a famous mark is "entitled to injunctive relief
against another party's commercial use of that mark if the use
'causes dilution of the distinctive quality' of the famous
mark." 08 Additionally, the Court noted that the term dilution
is initially defined as an "actual 'lessening of the capacity' of the
mark"'0 9 and the statute goes on to make a reference to a "'like-
lihood of confusion, mistake, or deception'" as a second caveat
101. Id. at 425.
102. Id.
103. Id. In so doing, the court reinstated the Plaintiffs claim for dilution
under a theory of blurring. Id.
104. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 425.
105. Id. at 427.
106. Id. at 422.
107. Id. at 433.
108. Id. at 432-33 (emphasis in original).
109. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433.
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for dilution.110 In the eyes of the Court, the fact that the "likeli-
hood of confusion" caveat followed the actual lessening of capac-
ity clause was significant because it indicated a congressional
intent to require "actual dilution" in order to establish a claim
under the FTDA."' By viewing these provisions in conjunction,
the Court concluded that "actual dilution" is essential to estab-
lishing a dilution claim under the FTDA."
2
Next, the Court highlighted the major shortcoming of the
"likelihood of dilution" standard that had been used in certain
jurisdictions. "[W]here the marks at issue are not identical, the
mere fact that consumers mentally associate the junior mark
with a famous mark is not sufficient to establish actionable di-
lution." 13 The Court reasoned that "[m]ental association will
not necessarily reduce the capacity of the [senior] mark to iden-
tify the goods of its owner, [which is] the statutory requirement
for dilution under the FTDA."1" 4 Neither blurring nor tar-
nishing are "a necessary consequence of mental association.""
5
Finally, the Court applied the "actual dilution" standard to
the particular facts of the case. According to the Court, the re-
cord established that the Army colonel, after seeing the adver-
tisement letter, made a mental association between the
"Victor's Secret" and "Victoria's Secret" marks."16 Nevertheless,
this association did not cause the colonel to form a different im-
pression of "Victoria's Secret."1 7 Thus, the record was devoid of
any evidence indicating a "lessening of the capacity of the Victo-
ria's Secret mark to identify and distinguish" its goods or ser-




113. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433. This holding is significant in that it creates the
dichotomy of dilution cases. First, "[tihe clear implication of this holding is that
where the marks are identical, the fact that consumers mentally associate the jun-
ior user's mark with a famous mark is sufficient to establish actionable dilution."
MCARTHY, supra note 58, at § 24:94.2. Second, "where the marks are not identi-
cal, the fact that consumers mentally associate the junior user's mark with a fa-
mous mark is not sufficient evidence to prove actual dilution .... " Id.
114. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433.







this had no effect on his conception of "Victoria's Secret."119
"His offense was directed entirely at the Petitioner [Defend-
ants], not at [Plaintiff] ."120 Moreover, the Plaintiffs experts had
"nothing to say about the impact of the [Defendants'] name on
the strength of the [Plaintiffs] mark."121 Thus, the Plaintiff had
failed to establish "actual dilution," which required the Court to
reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment.12 2
While the Court unanimously held that proof of "actual di-
lution" is necessary for a claim under the FTDA, it did not pro-
vide a definitive rule regarding the types of proof that will
establish "actual dilution."123 This was not the issue presented
under the particular facts of the case. 124 Nevertheless, the
Court's decision indicated a few potential means of establishing
dilution. First, while the Court did not explicitly state that con-
sumer surveys were an appropriate means of establishing "ac-
tual dilution," the Court's tacit approval of this method of proof
can be inferred from the majority opinion. 25 Second, while the
Court held that proof of actual loss or sales or profits is not nec-
essary to establish a federal trademark dilution claim, the
Court did not conclude that this kind of evidence could never
serve as a proper method of proving "actual dilution." 26 Fi-
nally, the Court noted that any "direct evidence of dilution...
will not be necessary if actual dilution can reasonably be proven
through circumstantial evidence." 127
C. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
While the Court may not have been presented with the sit-
uation of describing the appropriate methods of proving "actual
dilution," the shortcoming of the Court's analysis was identified
119. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 434.
120. Id. at 434.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See Vassallo & Duhaime, supra note 6, at 3.
124. Rather, the Court's inquiry was limited to whether the FTDA required
objective proof of actual injury to the value of a senior mark. KANE, supra note 31,
at § 9:1.2.
125. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 434.
126. Id. at 433.
127. Id. at 434. This is the case where the marks are identical. Id.
174 [Vol. 25:157
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in Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion.128 Justice Kennedy
recognized that "[tihe remaining issue is what factors are to be
considered to establish dilution."129 However, instead of giving
a clear description of the types of proof required for "actual dilu-
tion," Justice Kennedy wavers between discussing concepts
sounding of "actual dilution" and espousing principles that
sound strikingly similar to the "likelihood of dilution"
standard. 130
In considering whether dilution has been established, Jus-
tice Kennedy explained that "considerable attention should be
given.., to the word 'capacity' in the statutory phrase that de-
fines dilution .. ..",131 Justice Kennedy reasoned that "the word
'capacity' imports into the dilution inquiry both the present and
the potential power of the famous mark to identify and distin-
guish goods, and in some cases the fact that this power will be
diminished could suffice to show dilution."' 32 As such, he con-
cluded that "[ilf a mark will erode or lessen the power of the
famous mark to give customers the assurance of quality and the
full satisfaction they have in knowing they have purchased
goods bearing the famous mark, the elements of dilution may be
established."' 33
Moreover, Justice Kennedy noted that "[diminishment of
the mark's capacity can be shown by the probable consequences
flowing from use or adoption of the competing mark."' 34 This
idea is consistent with the purpose of injunctive relief provided
by the FTDA which "is to 'prevent future wrongs, although no
right has yet been violated.'"'135 Accordingly, "[a] holder of a fa-
mous mark threatened with diminishment of the mark's capac-
ity to serve its purpose should not be forced to wait until the
damage is done and the distinctiveness of the mark has been
eroded."'136
128. Id. at 435. The court held that "the evidentiary showing required by the
statute can be clarified on remand." Id.
129. Id.
130. See Turcotte, supra note 26, at 901.
131. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 435.
132. Id. (emphasis added).
133. Id. (emphasis added).
134. Id. (emphasis added).
135. Id. at 436 (citing Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928)).




While Justice Kennedy's concurrence attempts to highlight
the factors that are to be considered in order to establish "actual
dilution," it does little more than muddle the issue. Justice
Kennedy's usage of phrases like "threatened," "probable conse-
quences," "will be diminished," and "will erode or lessen" sug-
gests a future harm that has not yet impacted the holders of
senior marks (which is the apparent purpose of dilution law).
Thus, the language of the concurrence sounds of the "likelihood
of dilution" standard that was overruled by the majority
opinion.
According to Justice Kennedy, if it is "probable" that the
junior mark "will erode or lessen" the capacity of a senior mark
to act as a unique identifier, the "threatened diminishment"
posed by the junior mark should be actionable. 137 This position
seems to afford more protection to holders of famous marks by
providing the courts with a flexible means of addressing dilu-
tion. Thus, Justice Kennedy's position seems to directly contra-
dict, or at least weaken, the "actual dilution" standard adopted
by the majority. Accordingly, one must look to recent case law
to see how the lower courts have applied the Moseley test of "ac-
tual dilution."
Part IV: Proving Actual Dilution in a Post-Moseley Court
A. The Metamorphosis of the Actual Dilution Standard:
Pre-Moseley and Beyond
Proof of actual dilution "may make it more difficult for
trademark owners to obtain Federal relief, but it ensures that
trademark owners do not receive the windfall of such relief
when they have not been harmed."1 38 While a definite rationale
exists for requiring "actual dilution," the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Moseley did little to provide meaningful guidance as to
the types of proof necessary to establish "actual dilution." Thus,
parties seeking to secure a dilution claim under the FTDA are
faced with the challenge of trying to determine the kinds of evi-
137. See generally id. at 435-36.
138. Kellogg Co. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 192 F. Supp. 2d 790, 804 (W.D. Tenn.
2001); see also Moseley, 537 U.S. at 434 (noting that the difficulties of proof en-
tailed in establishing actual dilution alone is not an acceptable reason for dispens-
ing with the high proof requirement of the FTDA).
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dence they must produce in order to establish a federal trade-
mark dilution claim.139
The limited guidance provided by the majority opinion re-
garding the test of "actual dilution" was based upon a Fourth
Circuit decision, which was the first circuit court to establish
the type of evidence needed to prove "actual dilution" under the
FTDA. In Ringling Brothers, Barnum & Bailey Combined
Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel Development, the Fourth
Circuit held that proof of actual economic loss, consumer
surveys, and other pertinent circumstantial evidence are all rel-
evant to establishing a federal dilution claim.140 While the
Ringling Brothers decision may provide some guidance to indi-
viduals seeking to establish a federal dilution claim, based upon
the test of "actual dilution," the Moseley decision modified the
Fourth Circuit's holding to some extent. 41 The purpose of this
next section is to determine how courts treat the evidentiary
requirements of the "actual dilution" standard, originally ar-
ticulated in Ringling Brothers, as they have been modified by
the Moseley decision. Furthermore, this section conveys the
kinds of proof that can be used to establish "actual dilution" in a
post-Moseley court.
B. Proof of Actual Economic Loss
While the Fourth Circuit held that proof of an actual loss of
revenue is sufficient to establish a claim under the FTDA,14 2 the
Supreme Court held that it is not a requirement to establishing
a dilution claim. 143 Even though proof of lost revenue is not re-
139. See Vassallo & Duhaime, supra note 6.
140. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of
Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 465 (4th Cir. 1999). Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit
found that relevant circumstantial evidence by itself was not enough to establish
actual dilution, it would have to be used in conjunction with carefully constructed
consumer surveys, proof of economic loss, and other types of evidence. See id.
("[Rielevant contextual factors such as the extent of the junior mark's exposure,
the similarity of the marks, the firmness of the senior mark's hold, are of obvious
relevance as indirect evidence that might complement other proof.").
141. In particular, the Court's decision seems to permit reliable circumstan-
tial evidence, by itself, as a valid means of establishing "actual dilution." Moseley,
537 U.S. at 434. Additionally, the Court found the demonstration of lost profits or
revenues is not required to establish a claim under the FTDA. Id. at 433.
142. Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 465.




quired to demonstrate "actual dilution," intuitively this kind of
proof would necessarily provide at least some evidence for es-
tablishing "actual dilution" under the FTDA.144 Nevertheless, a
plaintiff should be careful not to simply submit gross earning
figures and expenses associated with their trademark in an at-
tempt to prove dilution.14 This fact was demonstrated by the
Moseley decision, which found that gross earnings were not
enough, by themselves, to demonstrate "actual dilution."'146
A noted problem with using lost profits to demonstrate "ac-
tual dilution" is that it results in an after-the-fact remedy which
will likely be disfavored by the holders of famous marks. As one
court has explained, proving dilution through evidence of lost
profits is inappropriate to plaintiffs for two reasons. 47 First,
"[i]f the famous senior mark were being exploited with continu-
ally growing success, the senior user might never be able to
show diminished revenues, no matter how obvious it was that
the junior use diluted the distinctiveness of the senior." 48 Sec-
ond, "[e]ven if diminished revenue could be shown, it would be
extraordinarily speculative and difficult to prove that the loss
was due to the dilution of the mark." 49 Despite the problems
associated with this method of proof, actual economic loss
should be given at least some weight in establishing a federal
trademark dilution claim. It would seem nonsensical for a court
to preclude a party from using proof of actual losses to prove
144. If the senior mark holder can establish a causal link between their loss in
revenue and the actions of junior mark holders, it would seem nonsensical to be-
lieve that such losses could not be used to help prove actual dilution. The require-
ments for definitively establishing this causal link are beyond the scope of this
article, but it seems that proof of actual lost revenue, which can be reliably linked
to the actions of a junior mark holder, can be used to establish dilution under the
FTDA.
145. Christopher T. Micheletti & Dan Zoloth Dorfman, Proving Dilution by
Blurring: An Analysis of Dilution by Blurring Factors Under the Federal Trade-
mark Dilution Act, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 1345, 1378 (2002) ("A plaintiff cannot sim-
ply produce the defendant's sales figures and argue that dilution can be inferred
from such evidence.").
146. See generally Moseley, 537 U.S. 418.
147. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999). While this
was a pre-Moseley decision, the rationale seems appropriate today.
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"actual dilution" if the losses are reliably linked to the junior
marks use of the senior mark. 150
C. Consumer Surveys
Consumer surveys are another method of proof that can be
used to establish "actual dilution" under the FTDA. 15' A con-
sumer survey is a document prepared by an expert which "in-
troduces 'the actual responses of a group of [relevant
consumers] whose perceptions are at issue in [a] case."' 52 As
such, survey evidence "provides a 'more scientific means' of
demonstrating trademark dilution." 53 Accordingly, a customer
survey will most likely be "a plaintiffs strongest and most per-
suasive evidence" in proving their federal trademark dilution
claim.'54
Notwithstanding, there are several problems associated
with consumer surveys. First, they tend to be expensive and a
nationwide general public survey can cost in excess of
$250,000.155 Second, the scope of a valid consumer survey is dif-
ficult to tailor. 156 Third, it is hard to establish a sufficient
mental association between the senior and junior mark, and the
150. At least one scholar has been highly critical of the use of lost sales or
profits to establish actual dilution, recognizing that it will be difficult for a plaintiff
to establish a nexus between lost profits/sales and the junior mark holder's use of a
senior mark. See GILSON, supra note 73, at § 5A.01(7)(a). As Gilson notes, "[ilf
proof of such an economic loss were required, a dilution plaintiff might be forced to
show a loss of revenues for its own product lines and attempt to prove a causal
relationship for that loss." Id. Essentially, the tactic would be futile because the
'owners of famous marks typically compete in enormously complex industries and
a wide variety of factors contribute to their bottom line." Id.
151. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433; Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined
Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 465 (4th Cir. 1999)
("[C]onsumer survey[s] designed not just to demonstrate 'mental association' of the
marks in isolation, but further consumer impressions from which actual harm and
cause might rationally be inferred."). For a thorough discussion on creating con-
sumer surveys, see Bible, supra note 70 (discussing several different methods of
performing consumer surveys in order to establish actual dilution).
152. Bible, supra note 70, at 314-15.
153. Id. at 315.
154. Id. at 314.
155. Vassallo & Duhaime, supra note 6, at 2. However, such an extensive
study will not always be necessary because a good survey should draw its respon-
dents "from the universe of people who have or are likely to encounter the accused
mark in the real world." Id.




survey can actually defeat a dilution claim if such an associa-
tion is not demonstrated. 157
At least one recent court decision helps highlight the chal-
lenges associated with consumer surveys. In Kellogg Co. v. Tou-
can Golf, Inc., the defendant, a corporation, which
manufactured promotional golf items, registered the words
"Toucan Gold" with the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
and used a logo with a toucan bird in connection with its prod-
ucts. 158 The plaintiff, Kellogg, brought a suit for trademark di-
lution, claiming that the use of the word mark and the toucan
logo caused consumer confusion. 159 To support their claim, the
plaintiff submitted two surveys as proof of dilution. 160 Never-
theless, the court found that the evidence failed to demonstrate
that the defendant's use of its toucan marks negatively affected
consumers' ability "to recognize that Toucan Sam represents
only Fruit Loops." 161 One survey was performed in 1991, prior
to when the defendant started its business. 162 The survey indi-
cated that 94% of children recognized Toucan Sam and 81% of
children related him to Fruit Loops. 16 3 A second survey was
performed in 1997, after the defendant started its business,
which indicated that 94% of adults recognized Toucan Sam. 64
The court found that the plaintiffs surveys were insufficient to
show that any segment of the population recognized Toucan
Sam as the "spokesbird" only for Fruit Loops in lesser numbers
than before the time the defendant began using its toucan
mark. 65 Thus, the plaintiff s offer of proof disproved its cause
157. Where the survey does not demonstrate a sufficient mental association
between the senior and junior mark, a claim of dilution is weakened. Micheletti &
Dorfman, supra note 145, at 1392. Similarly, where a junior mark is well-known
in a particular geographic area, and the senior user is no less well-known than
elsewhere, then no actual dilution has occurred by blurring. Id.
158. Toucan Golf, 337 F.3d at 620-22.
159. Id. at 622.
160. Id. at 628.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Toucan Golf, 337 F.3d at 628.
164. Id.
165. Id.; but see Wawa, Inc. v. Haaf, Civ. A. No. 96-4313, 1996 WL 460083
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 1996). In Wawa, Inc. the court found that a marketing survey of
the local neighborhood which indicated that only twenty-nine percent of persons
living in the area identified the junior mark with the senior mark was sufficient to
180 [Vol. 25:157
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of action for trademark dilution, which is a potential danger
when using a consumer survey. 166
Despite the inherent problems associated with consumer
surveys, they appear to be the most effective way to establish
"actual dilution," especially where the marks at issue are not
identical. 167 One problem encountered by the Plaintiff in Mose-
ley was its failure to demonstrate that the Defendants' use of
the senior mark affected the ultimate consumer's impression of
the Victoria's Secret mark. How else does one establish such a
change in impression absent a consumer study?
D. Expert Testimony168
The use of expert testimony is recognized as an appropriate
method of proving one's prima facie case of trademark dilution
under the FTDA, 169 assuming that such testimony is helpful to
resolving the issue of dilution. This method of proof has been
recognized by multiple treatises in the field of federal trade-
mark dilution,170 and may take a number of forms. First, a mar-
keting or advertising expert can testify that a senior mark will,
as a matter of fact, lose its selling power as a result of the dilu-
establish a dilution claim. Id. at *2. The court eventually applied the likelihood of
dilution standard to uphold the claim. Id. at *3.
166. Id. at 616.
167. See MCCARTHY, supra note 58, at § 24:94.2(2) ("The author suggests that
... evidence of actual dilution damage in non-identical marks cases will often fall
into two categories: expert testimony and survey evidence.").
168. As a matter of evidentiary law, a plaintiff will have to satisfy the four
prongs of the Daubert test, a prerequisite for establishing the admissibility of
expert testimony in federal court. See, e.g., NFL Props., Inc. v. Prostyle, Inc., 57 F.
Supp. 2d 665 (E.D. Wis. 1999). Accordingly, the court must consider: "whether
[the expert's] 'theory or technique... can be (and has been) tested'; whether it 'has
been subjected to peer review and publication'; whether there is a high 'known or
potential rate of error' and whether there are 'standards controlling the
technique's operation'; and whether the theory or technique enjoys 'general
acceptance' within a 'relevant scientific community.'" Id. at 668 (quoting Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993)).
169. See Moseley, 537 U.S. 418, 434 (2003) (noting that the Plaintiffs experts
failed to say anything about the impact of the Defendant's name on the strength of
the Plaintiffs mark).




tive use attributed to the junior user.171 Second, a plaintiff may
wish to employ a licensing expert to testify to the fact that
brand extension opportunities of the senior mark are foreclosed
by the junior use of the mark, which in turn decreases the value
of the famous mark.172 Third, a party skilled in the valuation of
a trademark can opine to the fact that the net worth of the se-
nior mark has been negatively impacted by the junior use. 173
E. Other Circumstantial Evidence
Under Ringling Brothers, circumstantial evidence served
only a limited role; it could be used as indirect evidence that
might complement other proof.174 Thus, circumstantial evi-
dence, by itself, was insufficient to establish actual harm. 75 It
has been argued that this factor is superfluous, because once a
party overcomes the "high hurdle" of presenting evidence in the
form of a consumer survey or actual harm, contextual factors
are of little use to the court's analysis. 76 Nevertheless, the Su-
preme Court held that "actual dilution can reliably be proven
through circumstantial evidence - the obvious case is one where
the junior and senior marks are identical." 77 A number of post-
Moseley cases have addressed federal trademark dilution claims
predicated on circumstantial evidence, typically relying upon
the identical nature of the junior and senior marks as their
frame of reference. 78
171. McCARTHY, supra note 58, at § 24:94.2(2)(a); see KANE, supra note 31, at
§ 9:3.5(D) (the testimony of marketing experts can be used as evidence of actual
dilution).
172. McCARTHY, supra note 58, at § 24:94.2(2)(c).
173. Id.
174. In Ringling Bros., the court stated that "relevant contextual factors such
as the extent of the junior mark's exposure, the similarity of the marks, the firm-
ness of the senior mark's hold, are of obvious relevance as indirect evidence that
might complement other proof." Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined
Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 465 (4th Cir. 1999) (empha-
sis added).
175. Id. at 465; see also Micheletti & Dorfman, supra note 145, at 1380.
176. Micheletti & Dorfman, supra note 145, at 1380.
177. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 434.
178. See, e.g., Lee Middleton Original Dolls, Inc. v. Seymour Mann, Inc., 299
F. Supp. 2d 892 (E.D. Wis. 2004); Pinehurst, Inc. v. Wick, 256 F. Supp. 2d 424
(M.D.N.C. 2003); Scott Fetzer Co. v. Gehring, 288 F. Supp. 2d 696 (E.D. Pa. 2003);
Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, No. 02 Civ. 9377, 2003 WL 22451731 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 24,
2003); Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Goody's Family Clothing, Inc., No. 1:00-
CV-1934, 2003 WL 22331254 (N.D. Ga. May 3, 2003).
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In Pinehurst Inc. v. Wick, the defendants were in the busi-
ness of registering domain names and then selling these domain
names back to companies who claimed the domain names as
their mark.179 The defendants registered the domain name
"PinehurstResort.com." 80 The plaintiff was the owner of the in-
ternationally famous Pinehurst Golf Resort and Pinehurst No. 2
Golf Course.' 8' The plaintiff contacted the defendants and re-
quested them to transfer the "Pinehurst" domain name over to
it.182 The defendants refused and the plaintiff brought suit al-
leging that the domain name was identical or confusingly simi-
lar to plaintiffs Pinehurst mark. 8 3 The court held that the
defendants diluted the plaintiffs mark due to the identical or
virtually identical character of their domain names to the plain-
tiffs mark. 84 The court found "actual dilution" because "[a]
consumer using the Internet will be unable to discern any ap-
preciable difference between the [dlefendants' domain names
and [plaintiffs marks."8 5
In Lee Middleton Original Dolls, Inc. v. Seymour Mann,
Inc., the district court was faced with a trademark dilution
claim where the marks were nearly identical. 8 6 The plaintiff,
Lee Middleton Original Dolls (LMOD), manufactured dolls and
sculpted the hands, faces, and feet of the dolls out of vinyl.'87
This unique feature made the LMOD dolls look and feel real,
which increased their popularity with consumers. 88 In 2000,
the LMOD put out a limited edition doll called the "Bright New
World" or "Millennium Angel" doll. 8 9 In 2001, the defendant,
Seymour Mann, manufactured the "My Special Angel Doll." 90
This doll, like that of LMOD, was made of vinyl and both were
referred to as angel dolls. s'9 Based upon the apparent similar-
179. Pinehurst, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d at 426.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 425-26.
182. Id. at 426.
183. Id.
184. Pinehurst, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 432.
185. Id.
186. 299 F. Supp. 2d 892 (E.D. Wis. 2004).








ity of the dolls (i.e., sculpted vinyl hands, feet, and heads), and
the developing status of the evidentiary requirements for an
FTDA claim, the court denied the defendant's request for sum-
mary judgment. 192 Rather, the court permitted the dilution
claim to go to the jury due to the identical nature of the dolls,
and to determine whether "actual dilution" had been
established. 193
Additionally, in Scott Fetzer Co. v. Gehring, the district
court granted a dilution claim based upon the identical nature
of the senior and junior marks. 94 The plaintiff was the owner of
the "Kirby" trademark, which became famous through its dis-
tinctive sales network that was used to sell vacuum cleaners
throughout the United States.195 Nearly fifty years after the
"Kirby" mark became famous, the defendant started his own
business of selling and servicing "Kirby" vacuum cleaners. 96
After determining that the plaintiff had demonstrated all other
elements of a trademark claim,197 the court went on to decide
whether the plaintiff had established "actual dilution."198 When
ruling on this issue, the court found that: (1) the defendant was
selling the plaintiffs mark without authorization; 199 (2) the
marks used by the defendant were identical to those owned by
the plaintiff;200 (3) the defendant was using the mark to sell
products that were previously sold by plaintiff;20 ' and (4) the
defendant sold and repaired products and falsely advertised
that his merchandise came with a one-year manufacturer's
192. Id. at 903.
193. Id. at 903; accord Nike, Inc. v. Variety Wholesalers, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d
1352, 1372 (S.D. Ga. 2003) (where the court concluded that the defendant had di-
luted Nike's trademarks due to the identical or virtually identical character of the
marks on the accused goods to the Nike trademarks).
194. 288 F. Supp. 2d 696 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
195. Id. at 702.
196. Id.
197. In the eyes of the court, the plaintiff had established the other elements
of a dilution claim, namely: (1) that the plaintiff was the owner of a famous mark;
(2) that the defendant made commercial use of the senior mark in interstate com-
merce; and (3) that the defendant's use of the plaintiffs mark began after the
plaintiffs mark became famous. Id.
198. Id.
199. Scott Fetzer Co., 288 F. Supp. 2d at 702.
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guarantee. 2 2 The court concluded that the totality of the cir-
cumstances put the parties in direct competition, and that the
"likelihood for confusion by the general consuming public [was]
great."203 As such, the plaintiff had successfully established ac-
tual harm and a claim of dilution under the FTDA.
Customer complaints are another form of circumstantial
proof that can be used to establish "actual dilution." In Four
Seasons Hotels & Resorts B. V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., the court
held that the record reflected "evidence of actual harm to Four
Seasons in the form of customers who complained that the [de-
fendant's] hotel 'wasn't a Four Seasons' due to its substandard
nature, incomplete construction[,] and inferior furnishings and
finishings."20 4 The court held that these complaints constituted
sufficient circumstantial evidence of actual harm in order to es-
tablish trademark dilution under the Lanham Act.20 5 Thus, or-
dinary opinion testimony, like the customer complaints in Four
Seasons, or perhaps direct customer testimony in the form of
affidavits, may serve as a practical and relatively inexpensive
method of proof to help practitioners establish a claim for trade-
mark dilution under the FTDA.20 6
The use of circumstantial evidence is likely to play a critical
role in proving "actual dilution" in the future. To date, demon-
strating the identical nature of marks, and the use of customer
complaints, have been the primary means of establishing "ac-
tual dilution" through circumstantial evidence. Nevertheless,
the types of circumstantial evidence that will fulfill the require-
ment of "actual dilution" remains uncertain because "[t]he
Court did not explain and no one seems to know what that 'cir-
cumstantial evidence' might be." 20 7
202. Id.
203. Id. at 703.
204. 267 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1332 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., Four Seasons, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 1332; see also KANE, supra
note 31, at § 9:3.5(D) ("testimony of consumers [is] possible evidence of the impact
of a defendant's use on the consumer's conception of the plaintiffs mark."). Never-
theless, a single customer complaint was found insufficient to establish "actual
dilution." See, e.g., Moseley, 537 U.S. 418.
207. Ty Inc. v. Softbelly's Inc., 353 F.3d 528, 536 (7th Cir. 2003).
2004] 185
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F. Other Potential Sources of Proof that May be Relevant to
"Actual Dilution"
The Second Circuit has developed a "nonexclusive" list of
factors that can be used to establish dilution under a theory of
blurring.208 The ten factors used to determine whether dilution
has, in fact, occurred are: (1) the degree of distinctiveness of the
senior mark;20 9 (2) similarity of the junior and senior marks;210
(3) proximity of the products and the likelihood of bridging the
gap;211 (4) the interrelationship among the distinctiveness of the
senior mark, the similarity of the junior mark, and the proxim-
ity of the products;212 (5) shared consumers and geographic limi-
tations;213 (6) consumer sophistication;214 (7) actual confusion; 215
208. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).
209. Id. at 217 ('[Tihe degree of distinctiveness of the senior mark has a con-
siderable bearing on the question whether a junior use [has] a diluting effect. As
the distinctiveness of the mark is the quality that the statute endeavors to protect,
the more distinctiveness the mark possesses, the greater the interest to be pro-
tected. And conversely, the more the senior mark tends toward the weak, common,
quality-claiming, or prominence-claiming type, the more strongly that weakness
would argue against a finding of dilution, especially if the senior use is in a dis-
tinctly different field.").
210. Id. at 218 ("The degree of similarity of the junior mark to the senior is an
obvious factor bearing.on a finding of dilution.").
211. Id. at 219 ("The closer the junior user comes to the senior's area of com-
merce, the more likely it is that dilution will result from the use of a similar
mark.").
212. Id. ("[Tihere is a close interdependent relationship among these factors.
The weaker any of the three factors may be, the stronger the others must be to
make a case of dilution.").
213. Nabisco, Inc., 191 F.3d at 220 ("Another relevant factor is the extent of
overlap among consumers of the senior user's products and the junior user's prod-
ucts. This factor is meaningful because dilution requires that a mark become less
distinctive to consumers. If the consumers who buy the products of the senior user
never see the junior user's products or publicity, then those consumers will con-
tinue to perceive the senior user's mark as unique, notwithstanding the junior
use.... If the senior user is famous, but only in a limited area, a junior use limited
to a different geographic area may not alter the perceptions of the senior user's
products.").
214. Id. ("Consumers who are highly familiar with the particular market seg-
ment are less likely to be confused by similar marks and may discern quite subtle
distinctions. Conversely, unsophisticated customers lack this discrimination and
are more vulnerable to the confusion, mistake and misassociations against which
the trademark law protects.").
215. Id. at 221 ("[Alctual confusion [can] be highly probative of dilution. Con-
fusion lessens distinction. When consumers confuse the junior mark with the se-
nior, blurring has occurred.").
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(8) adjectival or referential quality of the junior use;21 6 (9) harm
to the junior user and delay by the senior user;217 (10) and the
effect of the senior's prior laxity in protecting the mark.
218
While the Court alluded to these factors in Moseley, their signif-
icance in the analysis of "actual dilution" remains to be
tested.21 9 Additionally, it has been argued that some of these
factors have little, and potentially no, probative value on the
establishment of "actual dilution."220 Notwithstanding, a plain-
tiff may wish to use the Second Circuit's ten-factor test as a par-
adigm for constructing a dilution claim, placing greater
emphasis on the relevant factors and using them as a means of
establishing "actual dilution."
Alternatively, a litigant may wish to turn to other areas of
trademark law for guidance. While the law of trade dress and
infringement are distinct from dilution, and as a general mat-
ter, inapplicable to dilution law, attorneys may wish to look to
these other areas of law as sources of ideas for the types of cir-
cumstantial evidence they may wish to use to establish a dilu-
tion claim. The types of circumstantial proof relevant to
establishing confusion in trademark infringement and trade
dress claims that may be relevant to establishing trademark di-
lution include: exclusivity, length and manner of use of the se-
nior mark;22' the geographical scope of the mark's use;
222
marketing channels used by the senior mark and junior;223 the
quality of defendant's product vis- -vis the famous mark's prod-
216. Id. ("The stronger the adjectival association between the junior use and
the junior area of commerce, the less likelihood there is that the junior's use will
dilute the strength of the senior's mark.").
217. Id. at 222 (In resolving this issue, the court inquires into "Whether the
senior user's effort to enjoin the junior use was made with reasonable promptness
and whether the junior user will suffer harm resulting from any such delay.").
218. Nabisco, Inc., 191 F.3d at 222.
219. KANE, supra note 31, at § 9:5.3. While the Moseley Court rejected the
"likelihood of dilution" standard used by the Second Circuit, and other federal
courts, the Court did not reject the ten factor test.
220. See MCCARTHY, supra note 58, at § 24:94.4. In this treatise, the author
opines that the third, sixth, and seventh factors are either misunderstood dilution
law, misapplied dilution law, or are not relevant to the "actual dilution" analysis.
See id.
221. Adidas-Salomon AG v. Target Corp., 228 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (D. Or. 2002)
(discussing trade dress).
222. Id.




ucts; and the sophistication of the buyers. 224 While confusion
alone may be insufficient to establish dilution, it will aid in
demonstrating that a junior mark decreases a senior mark's ca-
pacity to serve as a unique identifier. As such, it may have
some bearing on proving "actual dilution."
Arguably, the ten factors espoused by the Second Circuit,
and the types of circumstantial evidence used in trade dress
and infringement claims, are relevant to the question of
whether a junior mark has actually decreased the senior mark's
capacity to serve as a unique identifier, and thus should be rele-
vant to establishing "actual dilution." Notwithstanding an ulti-
mate conclusion on relevancy, which is left up to the court,
these types of circumstantial proof, when used alone, would be
unlikely to establish "actual dilution." This is especially true
where the marks are not identical. Therefore, these kinds of
circumstantial evidence should be used in conjunction with
other types of proof in order to establish a federal trademark
dilution claim.225
G. Types of Evidence That Have Failed to Establish Proof of
Actual Dilution
At least one post-Moseley court has held that mere allega-
tions and offerings of proof which demonstrate that the junior
mark is identical to the senior mark may not be sufficient to
show "actual dilution."226 In Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, the
court held that despite difficulties in establishing additional
proof, a party is not excused from presenting some other cir-
cumstantial evidence of "actual dilution" besides the identical
nature of the junior mark.227 Accordingly, a plaintiff would be
advised to use other forms of circumstantial evidence in con-
224. Educ. Testing Serv. v. Touchstone Applied Sci. Assoc., 739 F. Supp. 847,
850 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (discussing trademark infringement).
225. Such as expert testimony, survey evidence, customer complaints and
opinion testimony.
226. See, e.g., Savin Corp. v. Savin Group., No. 02 Civ.9377, 2003 WL
22451731 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 24, 2003) (granting a motion for summary judgment
against Plaintiffs trademark dilution claim under the FTDA).
227. Id at *15. ("In the instant case, plaintiff offers no circumstantial evidence
of any kind tending to show actual dilution other than the fact that the marks are
identical. This is not sufficient. Hence, plaintiffs have failed to raise a material
issue of fact with regard to an essential prong of the dilution test").
188 [Vol. 25:157
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junction with the proof that the junior mark is either identical
or substantially similar to the senior mark.
228
Moreover, demonstrating the mere similarity of appearance
in conjunction with proof of the senior mark's strength may not
be enough to establish a dilution claim under the FTDA.229 In
Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Goody's Family Clothing, Inc.,
the plaintiff, Hilfiger, conceded that it had no direct evidence of
dilution of its mark.230 "Rather, Hilfiger argue[d] that evidence
of the similarity of Goody's trim packaging to the Hilfiger mark,
along with evidence of Goody's intent and the strength of
Hilfiger's mark, [was] sufficient to sustain its dilution claim."23'
However, the court held that "the factors . . . Hilfiger en-
courage[d] the court to use in assessing actual dilution [were]
identical to those employed by the court in the likelihood of con-
fusion analysis."232 Therefore, "actual dilution" had not been
proven and the plaintiff failed to establish a claim as a matter of
law. 2 3 3
Even where a carefully crafted consumer survey demon-
strates that members of the public associate the junior mark
with the senior mark, the survey by itself may be unable to es-
tablish actionable dilution.234 In Gateway, Inc. v. Companion
Products, the Gateway Corporation brought a federal dilution
claim and submitted a consumer survey supported by expert
testimony as its primary means of establishing its action.
235 U1-
228. Nothwithstanding the holding in Savin Corp, there is ample authority
indicating that the identical nature of senior and junior mark is sufficient circum-
stantial evidence of "actual dilution." See, e.g., Lee Middleton Original Dolls, Inc. v.
Seymour Mann, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 892 (E.D. Wis. 2004); Pinehurst, Inc. v. Wick,
256 F. Supp. 2d 424 (M.D.N.C. 2003); Scott Fetzer Co. v. Gehring, 288 F. Supp. 2d
696 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
229. See, e.g., Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Goody's Family Clothing, Inc.,
No. 1:00-CV-1934, 2003 WL 22331254 (N.D. Ga. May 3, 2003).
230. Id. at *41.
231. Id. at *42.
232. Id.
233. Id. at *43.
234. See, e.g., Gateway, Inc. v. Companion Prods. Inc., No. Civ. 01-4096, 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21461 (D.S.D. Aug. 19, 2003). Gateway was a corporation selling
a variety of computer related products, and as part of its national advertising cam-
paign it uses black and white cows and spots as a symbol for the company. Id. at
*2-3. The defendant, CPI, sold plush stuffed animals called "stretch pets" that
wrap around computer monitors, CPUs, or televisions. Id. at *4. One of its top
selling products is a black and white spotted cow called the "Cody Cow." Id.
235. See id. at *64.
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timately, the court concluded that Gateway's survey evidence
was not sufficient to prove that the defendant's mark, labeled
the "Cody Cow," actually dilutes the strength of its mark.236
"Although the consumer survey demonstrates that a significant
portion of the public associates Cody Cow with Gateway, it does
not demonstrate actionable dilution."23v Additionally, Gateway
submitted no additional evidence to show that defendant's prod-
uct actually lessened the strength of Gateway's mark.238 As
such, Gateway's evidence failed to demonstrate that the defen-
dant's mark undermines customers' ability to identify and dis-
tinguish the Gateway mark. 239 Thus, a plaintiff should avoid
submitting only a consumer survey to support their federal di-
lution claim.
Finally, certain factual circumstances, such as increased
revenues, may actually demonstrate that the value of the senior
mark has not been diminished by the junior mark's use of the
senior mark in commerce. 240 In Golden World Financial v.
WMA Mortgage Services, the plaintiff was a large holding com-
pany that held several trademarks known collectively as the
"World Marks" (WORLD SAVINGS AND LOAN, WORLD,
WORLD SAVINGS, WORLD'S 100% HOME LOAN, WORLD
SAVINGS, WORLD'S ESCALATOR, AND WORLD MORT-
GAGE).241 The WORLD MORTGAGE mark had been used
since 1986 in connection with the plaintiffs mortgage ser-
vices. 242 The defendant started its own mortgage service, and
changed its name to World Lending Group in 2001.243 A trade-
mark search company found over 100 companies in the mort-
gage service industry used the term "World."24 4 The plaintiff
alleged that the defendant's marks (WORLD LENDING
GROUP, WORLD LENDING, WORLD FINANCIAL GROUP,




239. Gateway Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21461 at *64.
240. See, e.g., Golden W. Fin. v. WMA Mortgage Servs., No. C 02-05727, 2003
WL 1343019 (N.D. Cal. March 13, 2003).
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luted the senior marks in violation of Section 1125(c). 245 The
court held that there was no evidence to show that the defen-
dant's use of the term "world" diluted plaintiffs business.246 "To
the contrary, plaintiffs boast[ed] nearly $65 million in assets
and in 2002, [the] plaintiff Golden West's profits were a re-
cord."247 Thus, certain circumstantial evidence, such as proof of
the senior mark's increased value, may actually be used to
quash a federal dilution claim.248 As a result, plaintiffs seeking
to demonstrate the value of their mark should be careful not to
place too much reliance upon this fact because it may eventu-
ally be used against them by the courts.
Conclusion
With the law of trademark dilution in a relative state of
flux, due to the fact that Moseley was decided fairly recently, a
plaintiff should avoid reliance upon a single type of proof to es-
tablish their federal dilution claim. Rather, plaintiffs should at-
tempt to present a wide variety of proof, including, but not
limited to: demonstrating identicalness or near identicalness of
the junior and senior marks;249 presenting a number of individ-
ual customer statements, and other related opinion testimony,
which convey that the junior marks use of the senior mark neg-
atively impacted the customers' impressions of the senior mark;
carefully tailored consumer surveys that note the changes in
consumers' impressions of the senior mark after the junior
mark begins using the senior mark in commerce; expert testi-
mony regarding the junior mark's capacity to dilute the senior
mark; and evidence which shows a causal link between lost
profits and the use of the senior mark by the junior mark
245. Golden W. Fin., 2003 WL 1343019 at *8.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See, e.g., id.
249. With limited exception, see Savin Corp. v. Savin Group., No. 02 Civ.9377,
2003 WL 22451731 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 24, 2003), demonstrating that the senior and
junior marks are identical or nearly identical amounts to conclusive evidence of
"actual dilution." See, e.g., Lee Middleton Original Dolls, Inc. v. Seymour Mann,
Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 892 (E.D. Wis. 2004); Pinehurst, Inc. v. Wick, 256 F. Supp. 2d





holder. 250 Similarly, a party may wish to resort to the Second
Circuit's ten dilution factors as a paradigm for fashioning their
federal dilution claim. These factors should be used as supple-
mental proof that a junior mark's use of a famous mark inhibits
the senior mark's capacity to serve as a unique identifier.
Armed with a wide variety of evidence, plaintiffs will be more
likely to succeed with their claim than if they relied particularly
on one form of proof to establish "actual dilution."
250. However, demonstrating lost profits is not a requirement under the
Moseley decision. See Moseley v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418,
434 (2003).
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